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PRACTICAL ALTERNATIVES TO THE
RULE OF JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY:
REGULATORY NEGLIGENCE AS A CASE STUDY
Boaz Segal †
I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine that you are the regulatory authority in the Ministry
of Environmental Protection that is tasked with reducing and
preventing air pollution. Now consider a scenario where an inn is
located adjacent to a polluting factory in some isolated locality. Due
to the factory’s decision to increase its production, it consciously
increases the level of pollution that it is causing, beyond the level
permitted by your office. Despite the periodic tests conducted by
your office, no violations are detected within a reasonable timeframe. As a result of the increase in air pollution, the owner of the
inn contracts a respiratory disease, with his medical bills totaling
$300,000. Furthermore, rumors begin spreading about excessive air
pollution in the area, and despite the fact that you are implementing
the requisite supervisory measures, people stop touring in the area,
which causes the inn owner economic damages totaling $200,000,
increasing the inclusive damage to the inn to $500,000. The inn
owner files a claim for damages against your regulatory authority,
and when the claim is filed, it turns out that the polluting factory has
become insolvent and you can no longer receive indemnity from it.
What is the optimal rule of compensation in these scenarios?
This case will be used as an analogy (hereinafter “the analogy of the polluting factory”), which will help analyze and explain
the judicial doctrines and rules that are presented in this article. As is
evident from the outset, this article analyzes the rules of compensa† PhD in Law, Faculty of Law – Sapir Academic College and Zefat Academic
College. This article is based on a chapter in my doctoral dissertation that I wrote
at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem under the mentorship of Prof. Barak
Medina. I wish to convey my gratitude to Prof. Medina for his salient comments
that elucidated matters, and my appreciation to Prof. Ofer Grosskopf, a Supreme
Court Judge in Israel, for his comments that further improved this Article.
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tion in damage claims involving three key players: (1) a negligent
supervised entity (the polluting factory, in the analogy), which is the
direct tortfeasor, whose share of the damage is usually greater than
the share of the other players involved in the array of torts; (2) a
negligent supervisory authority that supervises the negligent supervised entity1 (in the analogy, the regulatory authority in the Ministry
of Environmental Protection). This is the indirect tortfeasor that
supervises the tortious actions of the direct tortfeasor or regulates
them; (3) a plaintiff, the injured party, who sometimes is also
negligent and sometimes not (the inn owner).
Our working assumption is that the first two, the supervised
entity and the supervisory authority, are “joint tortfeasors”2 or
“multiple tortfeasors.”3 From the perspective of the injured party,
both the factory and the regulatory body were jointly negligent
towards the injured party’s sense of security. The injured party also
relied on the quality and safety of the service or product that he
consumed. Therefore, they should be deemed joint tortfeasors that
together committed a tortious act, even though they had not
coordinated this action between them, or as multiple tortfeasors that
operated separately but caused a single injury. Simply put, we have
a situation where it is known that the supervised entity and the
supervisory authority tortiously caused the plaintiff’s damages, but it
1

This article discusses instances when it is known and has been proven that both
the supervised entity and the supervisory authority were negligent, and as a
consequence, a single incident of damage was caused to a known injured party (or
to a known group of injured parties). In the analysis presented by Gilead, this
category of cases is called “Category B”, in which the extent of the damage caused
by the defendant is indeterminate. More precisely, in Gilead’s opinion, these cases
actually belong to “sub-category B.1”, in which all of the injured party’s damage
was caused by the tortious conduct of the defendants, potentially and actually. See
ISRAEL GILEAD, MICHAEL D. GREEN & BERNHARD A. KOCH, PROPORTIONAL
LIABILITY: ANALYTICAL AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 15 (Israel Gilead et al.
eds., 2013).
2
Within this scope are the following tortfeasors: tortfeasors that committed a tort
in concert; a principal tortfeasor and another tortfeasor that contributed or assisted
in the commission of the wrongdoing; or a principal tortfeasor and a secondary
tortfeasor that bears vicarious liability.
3
These are tortfeasors that operated separately and committed wrongdoings that
are not interdependent, but that caused a single inseparable damage.
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is not possible to accurately prove what share each of them had in
this damage.4
Insofar as the method of compensation in these cases derives
from the outdated “all-or-nothing” rule, then the court must choose
one of two paths that are polar extremes. The first is to negate the
supervisory authority’s liability and thus impose “zero liability” on
it. This is the law in relation to particular cases in the United States5
and in England.6 The second is to impose liability on the regulatory
4

In other words, what typifies the scenarios discussed below is that it had been
proven in these cases that the supervised entity and the supervisory authority
caused the damage through their negligence; however, there is some ambiguity as
to the regulatory authority’s share in this damage. For cases belonging to this
category, even if other than only within the context of regulatory accidents, see for
example: Fitzgerald v. Lane [1989] 1 AC 328 House of Lords, which involved a
plaintiff who was injured by two vehicles, one after the other, when it was unclear
which vehicle caused what share of the injuries; Huddell v. Levin 537 F.2d 726
(3d Cir. 1976), which involved a person who was killed during a traffic accident.
His estate sued both the negligent driver who collided with his vehicle, and the car
manufacturer, alleging that it had manufactured a defective headrest; Chrysler
Corp. v. Todorovich, 580 P.2d 1123 (Wyo. 1978) Town of Sentinel v. Riley, 43
P.2d 742 (Okla. 1935), during which the liability was imposed on the creator of
the nuisance, even though various nuisance-creators operated in the area who also
contributed to the damage; Azure v. The City of Billings, 182 Mont. 234, 596 P.2d
460 (1979), which involved a person who was assaulted by an individual, and the
victim’s injuries were exacerbated as a result of negligent conduct by the police in
his case, and it had not been possible to ascertain which percentage of his injuries
was caused by which tortfeasor. It should be noted that the general approach of the
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARMS §
28 (2010) is that in cases of this type, the burden of proof should be imposed on
the defendant, where he has to prove what share of the injured party’s injuries he
caused. If he does not bear this burden, then he will be held liable for the entire
damage.
5
See generally United States v. S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense
(Varig Airlines), 467 U.S. 797 (1984), (involving supervision of in-flight safety);
United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S 315 (1991), (involving supervision of a savings
and loan association). In these two cases, the public authorities were released from
liability, under the judgment exception currently prescribed in the Federal Tort
Claims Act. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1946).
6
See Financial Services and Markets Act, 2000, c.8 (Eng.), which in particular
instances grants a release from liability to the regulatory authority; see also Yuen
Kun-Yeu v. A-G of Hong Kong, [1987] 2 All E.R. 705 (UKPC); and Davis v.
Radcliffe, [1990] 1 W. L. R. 821 (UKPC). These two cases involved supervision
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authority, thereby, according to the Rule of Joint and Several Liability, also exposing the regulatory authority to a risk of full liability, if
there is no additional tortfeasor with collectible assets. There are
also examples of this in the United States7 and in England.8
In close connection to this, any judicial methodology that
engages in determining the rules of compensation in these situations
can ponder three central judicial rules, as follows. The first rule is a
rule that is stringent towards the injured party, the plaintiff.
According to this rule, the burden of proof must be imposed on the
plaintiff (the inn owner in the analogy) to prove all of the grounds
for his lawsuit in a way that tilts the balance of probabilities in his
favor (preponderance of evidence). With this rule, the plaintiff’s
lawsuit is liable to be systematically dismissed in limine, due to the
uncertainty regarding the precise share of damages caused by each
defendant. This rule, which systematically leaves injured parties in a
hopeless situation if they were injured by two tortfeasors, both of
which are at fault due to their conduct, is not optimal and should be
rejected.
The second rule is a rule that is stringent towards the regulatory authority, the defendant. According to this rule, both of the
tortfeasors including the supervised entity (the polluting factory) and
the supervisory authority (the regulatory authority in the Ministry of
Environmental Protection), should be held liable for all of the
damage suffered by the injured party. Because once damage was
caused that is inseparable, it would be proper for the tortfeasors to
bear it in its entirety, even if one of them will bear a far greater share
of bank stability, when the supervisory failures caused damage to customers of a
bank, which had collapsed. This was a claim for purely economic damage and it
was dismissed.
7
See Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S 531 (1988) (involving negligence in
supervising a vaccination that the plaintiff received, who contracted polio as a
result). The lawsuit was filed against the regulatory authority that had approved
the manufacture of the drug, and against the Food and Drug Administration that
had approved the marketing of the defective shipment.
8
See Perrett v. Collins, [1999] PNLR 77 (EWCA Civ 1998) (involving the crash
of an aircraft that led to the imposition of liability on the authority, due to
negligent licensing and supervision, which caused personal injuries to the
plaintiffs).
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than it actually caused. As will be elaborated below, this extreme
rule is also not optimal in cases involving regulatory negligence.
The third and proposed rule is the rule of the intermediate
path. According to this rule, a rebuttable presumption may be
applied, where the regulatory authority shall be held liable for a
particular portion of the injured party’s damages. This portion, as
shall be explained at length below, can be determined either by
imposing a statutory maximum compensation, or by imposing
proportional liability on the regulatory authority, or by a combination of rules. This intermediate path will be the focus of this article.
The objective of this article therefore, is to chart an intermediate path that enables the allocation of responsibility and the
imposition of some liability on the regulatory authority, but that
concurrently facilitates the avoidance of any systematic, exaggerated
and excessive bias against the supervisory authority in a way that
solely focuses on the objective of the compensation. Indeed, under
these circumstances, the supervisory authority should not be entirely
exempted from paying compensation to the injured party, but at the
same time it should not be adjudged to pay the entire sum. It would
be preferable to impose some of the amount on the supervisory
authority and to leave the other portion imposed on the injured
party, particularly in instances when the latter is also culpable for
causing damage. This issue is of great importance in environmental
law because it is common for polluters to go insolvent or otherwise
be unavailable to pay what they may be liable for.
The progression of the chapters in this article will be from
the normative to the positive, as follows. This article will begin with
an analysis of the main rules for limiting the regulatory authority’s
liability. Initially, the discussion will focus on the Rule of Proportional Liability (section II), followed by the Rule of the Statutory
Maximum (section III). During the analysis presented in these
chapters, this article will first relate to the advantages and disadvantages of the aforesaid rules, and after laying the theoretical foundation, the article will present a section under each rule in which
practical tools for applying the rule in order to enable its logical
implementation are presented.
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First, the article will discuss the mode of implementation of
the Rule of Proportional Liability. Under this section, this article
will propose taking the middle road, which reflects openness on the
one hand and prudence on the other, through the presentation of six
alternatives for implementing the Rule of Proportional Liability
solely in particular circumstances. Subsequently, the discussion will
focus on the Rule of the Statutory Maximum. This discussion will
be divided into two parts: how the maximum is determined, and
how the rule is applied. After exhausting the discussion of the Rule
of Proportional Liability and the Rule of the Statutory Maximum, in
relation to both their theoretical and practical aspects, the article will
discuss a number of plausible hybrid rules that integrate the three
rules of compensation (proportional liability, statutory maximum
and joint and several liability) (section IV). The article will culminate with a summary of the conclusions (section V).
II. RULE OF PROPORTIONAL LIABILITY
Various jurists have called for the abrogation of the Rule of
Joint and Several Liability and the application of the Rule of
Proportional Liability in its stead in particular circumstances.9
According to the latter rule, the liability of any defendant is limited
to its proportionate share of the cause of damage incurred by the
plaintiff,10 so that the joint tortfeasor is no longer forced to bear a
liability that is disproportionate to his relative responsibility. In the
context of this discussion, in a scenario where a supervised entity
and the supervisory authority cause a single inseparable damage,
each of them will be liable to the injured party according to their
proportionate share of the liability. In other words, each of the
9

See V. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE 258 (1986). It should be noted
that the rule to be discussed in this section is sometimes referred to in the literature
addressing this topic as “the Comparative Fault Rule.”
10
See generally WILLIAM L. PROSSER & PAGE W. KEETON, ON TORTS 475 (5th ed.
1984); see also M. Lindsey, Compensation, Fairness, and the Costs of Accident—
Should Pennsylvania’s Legislature Modify or Abrogate the Rule of Joint and
Several Liability Among Concurrently Negligent Tortfeasors?, 91 DICK. L. REV.
947, 947 (1986).
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tortfeasors will bear liability for a portion of the compensation
according to its proportionate share, but will not bear joint liability
for all the damage caused. This rule is not foreign to judicial methodologies around the world and is applied, in particular circumstances, in England,11 Austria,12 Poland,13 and in the United States.14
Possible ways to determine each tortfeasor’s share of the
inclusive damage will be discussed at length in a later section.
Nonetheless, this article will point out here that according to the
customary approach in tort law, two key considerations should be
taken into account when determining each tortfeasor’s relative share
of the damage. The first consideration is the extent of each defendant’s proportionate fault. The second consideration is the extent of
each defendant’s causative contribution to the damage.15 Using the
analogy of the polluting factory, if the injured party suffered damage
amounting to the inclusive sum of $500,000, the court will be able
to adjudicate that the direct tortfeasor’s share of the damage (i.e., the
supervised entity) is 4/5, while the indirect tortfeasor’s share (i.e.,
the supervising regulatory authority) is only 1/5. In this way, the
regulatory authority’s liability will be only $100,000.
The adoption of the Rule of Proportional Liability has three
major implications. First, according to this rule, the supervisory
authority (the regulatory authority) will be adjudged to pay compensation according to its proportionate share of the liability, i.e., only
$100,000, even if the injured party (the inn owner) has no possibility
of collecting the balance of his damages ($400,000) from the supervised entity (the polluting factory), which, as stated, became insolvent. In other words, according to the Rule of Proportional Liability,
the injured party, and not the indirect tortfeasor, shoulders the risk
that the direct tortfeasor’s share of the compensation will not be
collectible. Second, the indirect tortfeasor will no longer bear the
11

GILEAD, GREEN & KOCH, supra note 1, at 121–51.
Id. at 77–96.
13
Id. at 253–78.
14
Id. at 343–69.
15
This approach was also adopted under American law in relation to determining
defendants’ relative fault in class actions involving violations of securities laws.
See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78u-4(f)(3)(C) (1995).
12
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burden of filing contribution claims against direct tortfeasors subject
to its supervision, while the burden of suing all of the tortfeasors
together and of collecting from them the entire compensation will be
imposed on the injured party.16 Third, although upon adoption of the
Rule of Proportional Liability the ratio of compensation to be
adjudged to indirect tortfeasors will be reduced, since the sum of the
compensation can be expected to vary from lawsuit to lawsuit (as
well as the indirect tortfeasors’ relative shares of the damage), the
reduction in the compensation ratios will not be constant and known
in advance, but rather will vary from case to case.
A. Advantages
The Rule of Proportional Liability has been presented in
academic literature as offering significant advantages over the Rule
of Joint and Several Liability by referring to the variety of objectives
that tort law is striving to achieve.17
First, the advantage of this rule lies in its fairness from the
point of view of indirect tortfeasors, such as regulatory authorities. It
is obvious that one of the justifications for limiting the volume of
regulatory authorities’ liability is the lack of fairness of a judicial
rule that imposes on them the risk of shouldering the burden of the
entire compensation. The Rule of Proportional Liability can be
expected to rectify this distortion. Once this rule is adopted, not only
will the regulatory authority no longer bear the main direct
tortfeasors’ shares, but also, by determining its proportionate share
of the liability, the court will be able to give expression to the fact
16

See Stephanie A. Kraft, Modification of the Doctrine of Joint and Several
Liability: Who Bears the Risk?, 11 NOVA L. REV. 165, 177 (1986); see also
Lindsey, supra note 10, at 963.
17
See generally John W. Hill & Michael B. Metzger, Auditor Liability and the
S&L Crisis: Shaping the Future of the Profession?, 11 ANN. REV. BANKING L.
263 (1992); Jordan H. Leibman & Anne S. Kelly, Accountants’ Liability to Third
Parties for Negligent Misrepresentation: The Search for a New Limiting Principle,
30 AM. BUS. J.L. 347 (1992); Robert Mednick & Jeffery J. Peck, Proportionality:
A Much–Needed Solution to the Accountants’ Legal Liability Crisis, 28 VAL. U. L.
REV. 867 (1993); Kenneth E. Shore, Watching the Watchdog: An Argument for
Auditor Liability to Third Parties, 53 SMU L. REV. 387 (2000).
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that the regulatory authority’s contribution to the damage is indirect
and secondary, and therefore, so is the extent of its negligence.18
Second, the Rule of Proportional Liability also offers advantages in terms of effective deterrence. This rule can be expected to
heighten the regulatory authority’s incentives to take reasonable
precautionary measures when performing its regulatory work. This
rule acknowledges that, in terms of deterrence, it is important for the
tortfeasor to be exposed to a risk of liability that is commensurate
with the social loss expectancy that it is caused by its tortious
conduct. That being the case, the Rule of Proportional Liability
incentivizes regulatory authorities to act with reasonable standards
of care. Although the Rule of Joint and Several Liability also incentivizes regulatory authorities to avoid negligence, the Rule of Proportional Liability provides incentives to institute reasonable, but
not excessive, precautionary measures. Now, the implementation of
precautionary measures will not only reduce the probability of the
damage occurring or the probability of the imposition of liability,
but it could also affect the regulatory authority’s proportionate share
of the liability, and therefore its share of the compensation if
damage is eventually caused and if liability is imposed on it.
Third, the Rule of Proportional Liability can also be expected to reduce the administrative costs of accidents that originate in
contribution claims between tortfeasors. The Rule of Joint and
Several Liability incentivizes injured parties to sue the tortfeasor
with the deepest pockets rather than all of the tortfeasors. Accordingly, this rule poses a significant risk that the question of the
division of liability among the tortfeasors will be left to the second
stage of the litigation, with all of the administrative costs that this
entails. The Rule of Proportional Liability, which requires the
injured party to collect the proportionate share of the compensation
from each tortfeasor, incentivizes injured parties to sue all of the
18

See Kraft, supra note 16, at 186; E. J. McBride, Fair Enough? Modifying the
Rule of Joint and Several Liability in New Jersey, 20 RUTGERS L.J. 175, 184
(1988); Lindsey, supra note 10, at 967, 978; Richard W. Wright, Allocating
Liability among Multiple Responsible Causes: A Principled Defense of Joint and
Several Liability for Actual Harm and Risk Exposure, 21 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
1141, 1165–68 (1987).
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tortfeasors under a single lawsuit. In this way, the Rule of Proportional Liability increases the chances of concluding the action in a
single proceeding and could thus render superfluous the need to file
contribution claims and would thus avoid the administrative costs
that this entails. Moreover, the Rule of Joint and Several Liability is
liable to lower defendants’ incentives to settle, even in instances
when settling is the most efficient alternative, because defendants
who settled worry about being sued under a contribution claim by
defendants who did not settle. The Rule of Proportional Liability,
which eliminates the need to file contribution claims, can be expected to alleviate this concern too, and thus highlights the efficiency of
settlement agreements.
B. Disadvantages
Despite the advantages of the Rule of Proportional Liability,
it appears to have several disadvantages that should also be taken
into account. The first disadvantage concerns the economic stability
of the regulatory authority. Although the Rule of Proportional
Liability can be expected to reduce the volume of regulatory
authorities’ liabilities, the reduction according to this rule is not
fixed and the regulatory authority does not know the volume of its
liability in advance, since it depends in each case on the extent of
the damage suffered by the injured party and on the regulatory
authority’s proportionate share of this damage. Therefore, in instances where the damage caused is substantial in scope (as in the
negligent supervision of a polluting factory that is adjacent to a
densely populated metropolis), and in instances when the regulatory
authority’s proportionate share of the cause of the damage is
substantial (as in the negligence of granting a license to market baby
food that is unfit for human consumption), the regulatory authority
is liable to bear a high percentage of the compensation, even under
the Rule of Proportional Liability. The sums of the compensation
are therefore liable to increase and adversely affect the authority’s
economic stability.
Another difficulty concerns excessive deterrence of the
regulatory authority. The risk of bearing extensive liability at a
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volume that is not known in advance, as well as the uncertainty with
regard to the court’s ruling on the question of the negligence, leaves
the risk of excessive deterrence on the table, which exists anyway, in
the judicial regime of full liability as well.
Furthermore, the Rule of Proportional Liability does not
completely eliminate the risks of not reaching efficient settlements.
Since this rule still involves uncertainty regarding the volume of
liability that the regulatory authority will be forced to bear, it could
harm the prospects of reaching settlements, even in instances when
economic efficiency considerations support concluding the action
with a settlement. Furthermore, considering the risk of bearing very
extensive liability, the volume of which is not known in advance,
the Rule of Proportional Liability is also liable to retain plaintiffs’
incentives to file damage claims against regulatory authorities, even
if their negligence is doubtful, in the hope that the authority will
strive to reach settlement agreements even for unsubstantiated
claims, and even if at issue are futile claims.
Finally, another possible argument against the Rule of
Proportional Liability is its unfairness from the point of view of the
injured party since, if this rule is applied, all of the risk of not being
able to collect the compensation from the direct tortfeasor falls on
the injured party’s shoulders. However, this argument against the
rule is not enough to justify preferring the Rule of Joint and Several
Liability over the Rule of Proportional Liability. The main reason
for this is that under the “simple” circumstances of tort law, in
which the plaintiff’s damage was caused by a single tortfeasor, the
plaintiff bears the entire risk of not being able to collect the compensation from the tortfeasor. The mere existence of an additional
tortfeasor does not justify changing the judicial rule and passing the
risk from the plaintiff’s shoulders to the shoulders of the solvent
tortfeasor.19 The argument that this could avoid unfairness towards
19

See Bartlett v. New Mexico Welding Supply Inc., 648 P.2d 579, 585 (N.M.
1982) (where the Supreme Court of New Mexico refused to apply the Rule of
Joint and Several Liability on the basis of this rationale when it asked: “[b]etween
one plaintiff and one defendant, the plaintiff bears the risk of the defendant being
insolvent; on what basis does the risk shift if there are two defendants, and one is
insolvent?”).

12

BUFFALO ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL

[VOL. 27

that plaintiff is not sufficiently convincing, since shifting the risk
from the plaintiff to the solvent tortfeasor simultaneously creates
unfairness from the latter’s point of view20 (and also from the
perspective of the entire public that is free of fault) when at issue is a
public tortfeasor. However, this argument may support the adoption
of a softer version of the Rule of Proportional Liability, to be
elaborated on in later section.
Consideration of all of the above leads us to the conclusion
that even under the Rule of Proportional Liability, the sums of
compensation that the regulatory authority will be adjudged to pay
are liable to increase, thereby retaining the concerns about the
authority’s economic instability, excessive deterrence against it,
parties not reaching efficient settlements and unfairness towards the
injured party. However, as will be now clarified, while these disadvantages should be considered, they do not suffice to justify
rejecting the Rule of Proportional Liability, along with its advantages as discussed in a later section. The adoption of the Rule of Proportional Liability, which links the extent of the regulatory authority’s culpability to the extent of its liability, may still provide a
solution for the majority of the disadvantages of the Rule of Joint
and Several Liability.
C. Proportional Liability—From Theory to Practice
This section will present practical tools for applying the Rule
of Proportional Liability. The purpose is to translate the theoretical
analysis presented in sections II(A) (Advantages) and II(B) (Disadvantages) into practical rules, and to explain how the proposed
solutions can be implemented during judicial proceedings. This
discussion, coupled with the theoretical analysis presented above,
will respond to the question of which rule is the optimal one. It
should be stressed that, if possible, the court should attribute to each
20

See Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants, Proportionate Liability and
Canadian Auditors—Brief Prepared for Legal Liability Task Force, 44 (1996);
Leibman & Kelly, supra note 17, at 391; Nancy L. Manzer, 1986 Tort Reform
Legislation: A Systematic Evaluation of Caps on Damages and Limitations on
Joint and Several Liability, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 628, 645–46 (1988).
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tortfeasor the precise share of the injured party’s inclusive damage
that it caused.21 However, it appears that it is usually not possible to
do so in cases of regulatory and supervisory negligence.
In the analogy, it appears to be impossible to ascertain the
precise share of the inn owner’s inclusive damage that was caused
by the Ministry of Environmental Protection, and to differentiate it
from the polluting factory’s share of this damage, because the negligence of the supervised entity and the negligence of the supervisory
authority jointly led to damage that is inseparable and unattributable.
Consequently, the rules should be formulated in a way that enables
the court to allocate the damage among the various tortfeasors. This
allocation, to be discussed in the following section, will be implemented not only on the basis of precise data, but also by way of
estimation and relying on a general assessment based on life experience and on common sense. Therefore, according to the Rule of
Proportional Liability, a rebuttable presumption will be applied,
where the regulatory authority is liable for a portion of the plaintiff’s
damage, the extent of which may be determined according to three
allocation methods as follows:
One method is to retrospectively impose on defendants a
rough allocation of the particular share of the overall damage that
they caused.22 This test is burdensome for the defendant, since it
will be difficult for the regulatory authority to prove what its share
of the overall damage was and to differentiate it from the direct
tortfeasor’s share. According to this method, if the regulatory
authority does not meet its burden, the court will apply the Rule of
Joint and Several Liability; with all of its inherent disadvantages and
difficulties (unless the court deems it appropriate to divide the
damage by way of estimation). Consequently, this method results in
undesirable outcomes; particularly in instances of regulatory accidents in which there is a wide gap between the extent of the regulatory authority’s culpability and the extent of the direct tortfeasor’s
culpability, in terms of fairness, justice and effective deterrence.
21

As in the case where a plaintiff is attacked by two dogs belonging to two
different people, with one dog biting his arm and the other biting his leg, when it is
possible to attribute to each tortfeasor its precise share of the injury caused by it.
22
This is the “retrospective causation test.”
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Given the undesirable outcomes of the first method, it would
be preferable to look to the other allocation methods. The second
method, which also requires the court to allocate the liability by way
of estimation, is to ascertain the relative culpability of each of the
tortfeasors during the relevant tortious conduct and to allocate the
damage among them accordingly.23 This possibility provides some
relief to the regulatory authority, because it enables it to indicate its
share of the overall damage not by “marking” its share precisely
(which can be nearly impossible), but according to the extent of its
relative fault, so that its liability will be partial from the outset.
According to the third method, which also provides relief to
the regulatory authority, each tortfeasor’s share will be determined
according to the ratio between the degree of risk to the plaintiff
created by the supervised entity and the degree of risk to the plaintiff
created by the supervisory authority (and only in the absence of any
relevant information will the damage be allocated equally). Here,
too, the court will be required to act by way of estimation. The court
will be delegated the task of evaluating the extent of the causal
contribution to the risk posed by the supervisory authority compared
to the extent of the causal contribution to the risk posed by the
supervised entity.24
It should be emphasized that even though the determination
of the regulatory authority’s proportionate share of the liability
according to each of these three methods might appear to be arbitrary at this stage, this is not necessarily the case. The court will be
able to consider a variety of parameters when reaching its judgement, including the gravity of the alleged negligence of each of the
tortfeasors, the duration of the alleged negligence by each of the
tortfeasors, and all data that could indicate the degree of risk of
possible damage to which each of the tortfeasors exposed the
plaintiff.
The process necessary to reach a precise determination, to the
extent possible, of each tortfeasor’s share in the inclusive damage is
not easy. When clarifying the extent of the regulatory authority’s
23
24

This is the “comparative culpability test.”
This is the “causal contribution test.”
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liability for the damage, the court will be able to consider the intensity of the connection between the regulatory failure and the damage
suffered by the injured party. At one end of the scale are instances
where there is a close connection between the regulatory failure and
the injured party’s damage. An example of this type of case could be
an individual who was injured when the planning authorities rezoned
land that is adjacent to his home, enabling the construction of a
public project such as the construction of an airport. At the other end
of the scale are cases where the authority’s connection to the
individual’s damage is loose and indirect. For example, party “A”
negligently leaves a pool of diesel fuel on the roadway and the
authority procrastinates in cleaning the hazard. In the meantime,
party “B,” a truck driver, drives negligently over the fuel spill, his
truck skids, overturns, and creates lengthy traffic jams. Party “C,” a
businessman who is stuck in one of these traffic jams, is late for a
business meeting and as a result loses an opportunity to sign a
contract that was expected to generate handsome profits for him.
The actions of supervisory authorities have a direct and
indirect impact on all spheres of life in society and that in instances
such as these, tort law raises a similar question: assuming that the
authority was negligent and is liable, along with the direct tortfeasor,
towards the individual, what share of the liability should the authority bear? According to the latter parameter, the intensity of the connection between the regulatory failure and the damage suffered by
the injured party, the court must ascertain whether the authority’s
failure constitutes a central key link in the cause of the damage or
whether it is minor and secondary. The more indirect the connection
between the authority and the damage caused, and the lower the
concern that the damage was caused due to the authority’s abuse of
its power in order to harm a single group or benefit another group,
the lower the authority’s proportionate share of the damage, and
accordingly, the lower will be the volume of the liability that it must
bear. The determination that the authority’s share is minor also
stems from an unwillingness to make it legitimate for an injured
party to sue the regulatory authority just because it has deep pockets.
Determining that the authority’s share of the damage is minor
conveys a moral and educational message: it is acknowledged and
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agreed that the authority’s share of the damage is very minor, and
that the compensation must be sought elsewhere, in the pockets of
the direct tortfeasor.
Notwithstanding this position, it is clear that the shift from
the Rule of Joint and Several Liability to the Rule of Proportional
Liability might be perceived as a daring leap and as a drastic change
that is hard to digest. Revisions and amendments to the customary
judicial rule are best done in measured steps, in order to lay the
foundation and allow people to adjust their mindset. That being the
case, how can we strike a balance between these two rules that are
vying for precedence? The Rule of Proportional Liability is desirable, due to considerations of fairness and justice, since fairness
demands that the liability of the defendant should be limited to its
share in the cause of damage and that the plaintiff shall not be
granted an advantage in receiving the compensation just because it
was injured by two or more defendants. However, fairness demands
that the risk of the insolvency of any of the tortfeasors should be
allocated to the rest of the tortfeasors that are culpable for their
conduct, and not to the innocent plaintiff.
In close connection to this, the Rule of Proportional Liability
indeed promotes important objectives, but at the expense of the
objective of compensation. Considering the aforesaid dilemmas, it
might be preferable to apply a more complex judicial rule, which
does not completely abandon the Rule of Joint and Several Liability
on the one hand, and does not entirely adopt the Rule of Proportional Liability on the other.25 A rule, in fact, that integrates the Rule
of Joint and Several Liability with the Rule of Proportional Liability.
Such a rule could be optimal in terms of fairness and corrective
justice, in terms of effective deterrence, and in terms of the objective
of compensation. In light of this, it is proposed below that the
middle road should be taken, one that strikes a balance between the
various objectives and expresses openness on one hand and prudence on the other. This will be done by proposing six alternatives

25

Kraft, supra note 16, at 185–87.
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for the application of the Rule of Proportional Liability solely under
particular circumstances, as detailed henceforth.26
i. The First Alternative—Clarifying the Tortfeasor’s Share of
the Damage
According to this alternative, the Rule of Proportional
Liability should be applied only in instances when the defendant’s
proportionate share of the liability is lower than a particular ratio.27
In this way, the indirect defendant can benefit from the advantages
of the Rule of Proportional Liability, without exposing itself to
disproportionate liability, only if its culpability is “minor” and its
share of the cause of damage is negligible compared to the direct
tortfeasor. This alternative provides a solution of sorts for the lack of
fairness in imposing all of the compensation on the supervisory
authority, when its responsibility for the damage is secondary and
indirect.
ii. The Second Alternative—Clarifying the Injured Party’s
Share of the Damage
According to this alternative, the Rule of Proportional Liability should be applied only in instances when the plaintiff is found
to have some contributory culpability.28 This alternative is based on
the idea that it is fair to impose the risk of the inability to collect
from the direct tortfeasor on the plaintiff in instances when he also
has some culpability for his conduct.29
26

This may be referred to as the use of a “modified form” of the Rule of
Proportional Liability, as opposed to its “pure form.” See id. at 169; Lindsey,
supra note 10, at 950.
27
Leibman & Kelly, supra note 17, at 393.
28
Lindsey, supra note 10, at 965–66.
29
This alternative applies the Rule of Joint and Several Liability in instances when
the plaintiff has no culpability, as the courts in Oklahoma have on several
occasions. See Anderson v. O'Donoghue, 677 P.2d 648 (1983); Berry v. Empire
Indem. Ins. Co., 634 P.2d 718 (1981); Boyles v. Okla. Natural Gas Co., 619 P.2d
613 (1980). Kraft notes that in the past, the Florida Senate has proposed to
legislate the principle negating the Rule of Joint and Several Liability in instances
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This alternative may be improved by tilting it in favor of the
plaintiff, so that the application of the Rule of Proportional Liability
will be limited to instances when the defendant’s proportionate share
of the liability is lower than or equal to the plaintiff’s proportionate
share of the liability. The fairness of this alternative is expressed by
abandoning the Rule of Joint and Several Liability and changing the
“rules of the game” to the detriment of the plaintiff, when the latter
also contributed to the damage to itself and when its share of the
cause of the damage crosses a particular threshold. On the other
hand, in instances when the plaintiff’s share did not cross this
threshold, the plaintiff can benefit from the Rule of Joint and
Several Liability, which is more advantageous.30 Prosser refers to
this method as an “equal fault bar” and a “greater fault bar.”31
According to the equal fault bar method, the plaintiff is prevented
any possibility of receiving all of the compensation from the
accessible and solvent defendant if it is found that the plaintiff is
equally culpable, or more culpable, than the defendant. According to
the greater fault method, the plaintiff is prevented any possibility of
collecting the entire sum as stated, only if it is found that its culpability is greater than that of the defendant.
A salient question that arises in this context of scenarios of
regulatory negligence is what is the fate of this alternative, whether
according to the equal fault bar or according to the greater fault bar,
when the lawsuit involves multiple defendants? Should the plaintiff’s negligence be compared to that of a particular defendant (i.e,
solely against the regulatory authority’s negligence) or compared to
the negligence of the entire group (i.e., to the negligence of the
supervised entity plus the negligence of the supervisory authority)?
While there are those who believe that the rule should apply when
the plaintiff’s share of the damage is equal to or higher than that of a
particular defendant, others believe that the plaintiff’s negligence
should be compared to the cumulative negligence of all of the
where the plaintiff’s conduct constituted contributory negligence. See also Kraft,
supra note 16, at 187.
30
See James Granelli, The Attack on Joint and Several Liability, 71 A.B.A. J. 60,
62 (1991); Kraft, supra note 16.
31
PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS; see Lindsey, supra note 10, at 473.
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defendants.32 In these scenarios, one can consider adopting the “49
Percent Rule,”33 where the plaintiff can receive full compensation
from the accessible and solvent defendant only if the extent of the
plaintiff’s negligence is less than that of that same defendant.
Accordingly, the extent of the plaintiff’s negligence should be
compared to that of each defendant severally, so that the Rule of
Joint and Several Liability will exclusively apply to the case only if
the plaintiff’s negligence is less than that of each of the defendants
severally. If this is not the case, then the Rule of Joint and Several
Liability will apply only in connection to a tortfeasor whose
negligence is greater than that of the plaintiff.
The logic of this alternative can be demonstrated through the
judgment in the Elder case.34 At issue was a judgment handed down
by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, which well demonstrates the
harsh criticism against the Rule of Joint and Several Liability in
terms of justice and fairness in the context of public tortfeasors. In
this case, the borough of Harrisville closed a portion of a highway in
the commonwealth in order to hold a march to commemorate
Memorial Day.35 As a result, vehicular traffic in this portion of the
highway was slowed.36 The plaintiff, Elder, drove on that highway
in the direction of Harrisville, and when he approached the area he
noticed a truck in front of him that braked suddenly when it reached
the top of a hill.37 Elder, in turn, also slowed down his car when he
approached the top of the hill, and when he passed it, his car was
rear-ended when a car driven by defendant, Orluck, collided forcefully into the back of his car.38 As a result, Elder suffered severe
injuries and he filed for damages in respect thereof.39 Orluck, the
direct tortfeasor, adjoined the borough of Harrisville to the lawsuit.
32

Id.
See Kraft, supra note 16, at 169–71, regarding the judicial methodologies that
enable a plaintiff to receive compensation only if the extent of its negligence is
less than that of the defendants.
34
Elder v. Orluck, 515 A.2d 517 (1986) (hereinafter Elder case).
35
Id. at 518.
36
Id.
37
Id.
38
Id.
39
Id.
33
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The allegation against the borough was its negligence, in that it
failed to warn drivers arriving at that locality about the existence of
the barrier, and that it did not detour the vehicular traffic so that it
would have a route around the march.40
The court ruled that Elder’s damages totaled $50,000, and
the jury divided the liability for the cause of the damage among the
parties involved, as follows: Elder, the injured party, 25 percent,
Orluck, the direct tortfeasor, 60 percent, and the borough of Harrisville, the indirect public tortfeasor, 15 percent.41 During the hearing,
the borough of Harrisville argued that Elder should not receive
compensation from the borough since the plaintiff himself borne a
greater share of the responsibility for the cause of the damage than
the indirect tortfeasor.42 The court rejected this argument, and on
appeal, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania ratified the lower court’s
decision and ruled that in cases such as these, the plaintiff will be
denied the right to full compensation only if its share of the cause of
the damage is greater than the shares of all of the defendants
aggregately.43 In light of the application of the Rule of Joint and
Several Liability in the circumstances of this case, the court
adjudged the borough of Harrisville to pay Elder the entire sum,
$187,500, despite the fact that its proportionate share totaled only
$37,500.44 Theoretically, the borough of Harrisville had the right to
be indemnified by Orluck to the sum of $150,000, but since this was
not collectible, the borough was forced to bear the payment of the
full sum by itself.
As shown in this case, the court interpreted the Rule of
Proportional Liability as applying only in instances when the negligent plaintiff’s share of the damage was larger than the aggregate
shares of all of the negligent defendants. This interpretation is not
devoid of difficulties. According to the judgment in the Elder case,
even when the regulatory authority’s share of the damage is smaller
than the plaintiff’s share, the former is liable to be adjudged to pay
40

Id.
Id.
42
Id.
43
See Lindsey, supra note 10, at 951.
44
Elder case, supra note 34, at 525–24.
41
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the entire sum, as long as the plaintiff’s share is not larger than the
aggregate shares of the regulatory authority and the direct tortfeasor.
Therefore, theoretically, according to this judgment, a plaintiff
whose share of the damage is fifty percent can receive the entire
compensation from the accessible and solvent authority whose share
of the damage is only one percent. It appears that the origins of this
interpretation are in an outdated approach that views tort law as a
battle between a tortfeasor on one side and an injured party on the
other side, without analyzing the differentiation between the various
tortfeasors.
To clarify this position, this article will apply the approach
that should have been adopted in the factual scenario in the Elder
case. To reiterate, in that case, the plaintiff-Elder’s share of the
damage was twenty-five percent, the direct tortfeasor, Orluck’s
share was sixty percent, while the share of the indirect tortfeasor, the
authority, was only fifteen percent. According to the proposed line
of reasoning, Orluck, the direct tortfeasor who generated the main
damage and is the party whose share of the cause of the damage is
higher than the plaintiff’s share, should be subject to the Rule of
Joint and Several Liability with all the risks that this entails.
Therefore, in the event that the authority cannot pay its share of the
compensation, Orluck bears this share as well. In this way, the main
generator of the damage is the party that bears its own share of the
damage, and in addition bears the risk that the indirect and secondary tortfeasor’s share might turn out to be uncollectible. On the
other hand, the liability of the indirect and secondary tortfeasor, the
authority should be limited solely to its proportionate share of the
compensation when, unlike Orluck, its share of the cause of the
damage is smaller than the plaintiff’s share. This approach reflects
the fact that the tortfeasors are not comprised of a single unit and
that there should be differentiation between the main generator of
the damage and a party whose share of the cause of damage is
secondary and indirect.
Lindsey notes in this context that the states of Louisiana,
Nevada, Oregon, and Texas adopted a similar approach a while ago
in order to strike a better balance between the Rule of Joint and
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Several Liability and the Rule of Proportional Liability.45 In these
states, the defendant was liable according to the Rule of Joint and
Several Liability only if its relative fault exceeded that of the
plaintiff.46 If not, it was liable only for its proportionate share of the
cause of the damage.47 This approach compares the culpability of
the plaintiff to that of each defendant, and then allocates to the party
with the greatest culpability the risk of bearing damage which is
disproportionate to its relative fault, in the event one of the defendant’s shares is uncollectible.48 In other words, if the culpability of
the plaintiff is greater than that of each defendant, the plaintiff will
be awarded compensation with respect to the defendants’ share of
the liability, and the defendants will only be held liable for their
proportionate share of the compensation that is awarded to the
plaintiff.
On the other hand, if the plaintiff’s culpability is less than
that of each defendant, all of the defendants will be liable to the
plaintiff jointly and severally, and each of them will bear the risk of
any uncollected shares of the other defendants. When the plaintiff’s
culpability is greater than that of one defendant and less than that of
another defendant, the first defendant will be liable to the plaintiff
according to the Rule of Proportional Liability, while the other
defendant will be liable to the plaintiff jointly and severally, and will
risk bearing liability that is disproportionate to its share of the
damage. The rationale behind both variations of the “Forty-Nine
Percent Rule” is that it is unfair to enable a plaintiff whose ratio of
culpability is greater than that of the defendants to benefit from the
Rule of Joint and Several Liability at the expense of defendants who
are less culpable.

45

See Lindsey, supra note 10, at 966.
Id.
47
Id.
48
Lindsey further reviews draft bills that aim to exempt particular public
authorities from the Rule of Joint and Several Liability, when the percentage of
their culpability is equal to or less than that of the plaintiffs, and equal to or less
than 50% of the total of all negligence attributed to the defendants as a group. See
id. at 970–71.
46
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iii. The Third Alternative—Clarifying the Category of
Damage Caused
Following this approach, the Rule of Joint and Several
Liability should be applied only when the heads of damage society
attributes to them has considerable and special importance, and
considers them to be grave damages, such as personal injury. On the
other hand, in relation to other heads of damage, such as pain and
suffering, the Rule of Proportional Liability applies. This alternative
strives to hold each defendant liable jointly and severally for the
damages suffered by the plaintiff, apart from “negligible” damages,
in relation to which the Rule of Proportional Liability will apply.
Therefore, this approach increases the plaintiff’s prospects of being
awarded the entire compensation for the majority of its damages.49
In other words, this rule may ensure full compensation to an injured
party for those heads of damage in instances when, without full
compensation in respect thereof, he is liable to collapse. However,
the plaintiff bears the risk that it may not collect some of the
compensation with respect to minor damages.50
We have doubts with regard to the efficacy of this alternative. If we return to the analogy of the polluting factory, the personal
injuries that the injured party suffered were subject to the Rule of
Joint and Several Liability. Under this alternative, his economic
damages, which totaled $200,000, could have been subject to the
Rule of Proportional Liability; however, in the absence of full
compensation in respect of this head of damage, he was liable to
collapse, considering all the secondary costs of accident this entails.
Moreover, it appears that the differentiation between major heads of
damage to which the society attributes primary importance and
minor heads of damage that are insufficiently clear is subject to
interpretation and is liable to result in the prolonging of the litigation
49

See Kraft, supra note 16, at 186.
This approach was applied in the state of California, where the Rule of Joint and
Several Liability was not applied only in the instance of non-economic damages.
See Lindsey, supra note 10, at 978 (noting that this approach is consistent with the
ruling of the Supreme Court of California in the case of American Motorcycle
Assn. v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d 578, 582 (1978)).
50
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and an increase in the administrative costs of accident that this
entails.51
iv. The Fourth Alternative—Dividing the Risk Between the
Indirect Tortfeasor and the Plaintiff
This alternative posits that the risk that the direct tortfeasor’s
share will be uncollectible should be divided between the regulatory
authority and the plaintiff, independent of the question of the latter’s
contributory culpability. Dividing risk between the indirect tortfeasor and plaintiff is an innovative approach, as that the direct
tortfeasor’s share, if uncollectible, does not fall entirely on the
regulatory authority’s (one of the outcomes of applying the pure
form of the Rule of Joint and Several Liability) plaintiff’s shoulders
(one of the outcomes of applying the pure form of the Rule of
Proportional Liability). Instead, the risk is divided between both
parties. Consequently, the court must first ascertain the proportionate share of each “player” in the damage the plaintiff suffered,
according to the Rule of Proportional Liability. During the second
inquiry, the court must divide the share of the defendant’s damage
which is uncollectible among the rest of the parties in a way the
court deems just and fair. In the absence of any information proving
otherwise, this share will be divided equally between the indirect
tortfeasor and the plaintiff.
To illustrate this alternative, we return to the analogy of the
polluting factory, in which the injured party suffered inclusive
damage totaling $500,000. Assume at the court’s initial inquiry, the
court rules that the (insolvent) direct tortfeasor’s share of the inclusive damage is 3/5, while the supervisory authority’s share is 2/5.
According to the proposed rule, the regulatory authority will pay its
share of the cause of the damage, i.e., $200,000. Now, if the direct
tortfeasor’s share was collectible, it would bear its share of the
damage ($300,000), and the regulatory authority would not be
forced to pay any additional payment. Since this was not the case,
51

Lindsey also expresses doubt about the ability of this method to promote the
objectives of tort law effectively. See Lindsey, supra note 10, at 978.
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the court had to divide the polluting factory’s share between the
regulatory authority and the plaintiff in a just and fair way, and in
the absence of any information proving otherwise, this share would
be divided equally.
If this share is divided equally between the parties, then the
regulatory authority will pay an additional sum of $150,000 beyond
its share of the damage, while the injured party will be compensated
to an extent that is short of the difference, since the overall compensation that he will be awarded will be $350,000. The additional
$150,000 that the regulatory authority is bearing, and the $150,000
that the injured party will not be able to receive, reflect the division
of the risk of the direct tortfeasor’s insolvency. Although this rule
partially suffers from the disadvantages discussed in the earlier
sections of this article, in terms of corrective justice and efficient
deterrence, it also partially benefits from the discussed advantages,
in terms of the objective of the compensation and the distributive
justice approach. In this way, this alternative presents a middle road
whose adoption should be considered.
v. The Fifth Alternative—Application of the Rules at the
Court’s Discretion
This alternative proposes to leave the court to decide
whether the Rule of Joint and Several Liability should be applied or
the Rule of Proportional Liability. This decision should be reached
while taking into consideration all of the circumstances of the case,
including the ratio of the plaintiff’s relative fault. If the court
chooses to apply the Rule of Proportional Liability, it will decide
each defendant’s share of the compensation according to the rules
discussed at the beginning of this chapter. The advantage of this
alternative is its flexibility and also that it allows the court to weigh
all of the relevant considerations when deciding which rule is
desirable under the specific circumstances of the case at hand.
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vi. The Sixth Alternative—Hybrid Rules
Additional possible rules may be formulated through a
combination of any of the five alternatives discussed above. Thus,
for example, it is possible to abandon the Rule of Joint and Several
Liability and adopt instead the Rule of Proportional Liability when
the plaintiff is more culpable than the defendant in the cause of
damage (the second alternative), provided that the injured party
suffered damages that are not personal injuries (the third alternative). Accordingly, the Rule of Joint and Several Liability will apply
in relation to personal injuries, while in relation to other damages
the plaintiff can benefit from the advantages of this rule, provided
that its culpability for the cause of damage is less than that of the
defendants.
III. THE RULE OF THE STATUTORY MAXIMUM
According to the Rule of the Statutory Maximum, a statutory
maximum compensation should be prescribed by law in relation to
the volume of the supervisory authority’s liability. If the court
decides that the regulatory authority’s proportionate share of the
compensation exceeds the maximum sum, it will not be possible to
adjudge that it pays a share higher than the maximum. On the other
hand, if the court decides that the regulatory authority’s proportionate share of the compensation is lower than the sum of the maximum, it will be possible to collect compensation from it not only at
the ratio of its proportionate share (which is not the Rule of
Proportional Liability), but also the balance of the compensation up
to the maximum, by virtue of the Rule of Joint and Several Liability.
In such an instance, the regulatory authority will have the option of
recouping from the direct tortfeasor the difference between its
proportionate share of the compensation and the maximum sum.
This issue will be clarified through the analogy of the polluting factory. Assume that the sum prescribed as the maximum is
$200,000. The injured party’s damages total $500,000. If it becomes
evident that the regulatory authority’s share of the damage is
$220,000 and that the direct tortfeasor’s share is $280,000, then it
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will not be possible to adjudge the regulatory authority to pay a
share that exceeds the maximum, and it will be adjudged to pay only
$200,000. On the other hand, if it becomes evident that the regulatory authority’s share of the damage is $100,000 while the direct
tortfeasor’s share is $400,000, then the injured party will be able to
collect compensation from the regulatory authority not only at the
ratio of its proportionate share of the damage ($100,000) but also the
balance of the compensation up to the maximum, i.e., a total of
$200,000. In such an instance, the regulatory authority will be able
to file a contribution claim against the direct tortfeasor in order to
recoup from it the difference between its proportionate share of the
compensation and the maximum, i.e., $100,000.
A. Advantages
The alternative that limits liability through a statutory
maximum has several advantages. The first being the over-deterrence aspect. Contrary to the Rule of Proportional Liability, this
method ensures that the regulatory authority’s liability, in any case,
will not exceed the particular sum stipulated as the maximum.
Consequently, this method creates certainty with regard to the
maximum sums that the regulatory authority might be adjudged to
pay, and thus avoids the risk of extensive liability, the volume of
which is not known in advance. Another advantage, closely connected to this, is that it might moderate to some extent the concern
about causing economic instability to the authority, with all of the
negative repercussions that this entails, primarily, harm to the
authority’s regulatory work.
Furthermore, this method can be expected to lead to savings
in the administrative costs of accident for a number of reasons. First,
the creation of certainty as to the maximum sums of compensation
that the regulatory authority is liable to be adjudged can be expected
to incentivize injured parties and tortfeasors to settle in instances
when settlement is the most efficient solution. Second, in instances
when the regulatory authority’s proportionate share of the compensation is higher than the sum stipulated as the maximum, it is
possible to adjudge it to pay compensation up to the maximum and

28

BUFFALO ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL

[VOL. 27

no more than that. In these instances, the regulatory authority will
not need to file a contribution claim proceeding against the direct
tortfeasor, with all the administrative costs that this mechanism
entails. Moreover, the reduction of the sums of compensation and
the greater certainty with regard to these sums may reduce injured
parties’ incentives to file futile claims and reduce regulatory
authorities’ incentives to settle claims of this type. The outcome can
be expected to be a reduction in the administrative costs of accident
and also a reduction in the phenomenon of excessive deterrence.
As for the considerations of fairness and justice when
dividing risks, the adoption of the Rule of the Statutory Maximum
will give expression to the fact that the regulatory authority’s contribution to damage in these cases is indirect and secondary. Furthermore, the adoption of this rule will lead to a division of the risk of
the direct tortfeasor’s insolvency between the regulatory authority
and the injured party. These matters may be illustrated using the
analogy of the polluting factory. Again assume that the sum
prescribed as the maximum is $200,000 and that the injured party’s
damage totals $500,000. If the regulatory authority’s proportionate
share of the compensation is $220,000, the injured party will bear
the risk that he might be incapable of collecting the balance of the
compensation exceeding the maximum ($20,000) from the direct
tortfeasor, as well as the risk that he will be incapable of collecting
the direct tortfeasor’s share of the compensation ($280,000). On the
other hand, if the regulatory authority’s proportionate share of the
compensation is only $100,000, the risk of the direct tortfeasor’s
insolvency will be divided between the regulatory authority and the
injured party jointly. The injured party will be able to be compensated by the regulatory authority up to the maximum, i.e., $200,000.
The regulatory authority will bear the risk of not being able to
recoup from the direct tortfeasor, the difference between the maximum sum, and the regulatory authority’s share of the damage, i.e.,
$100,000. On the other hand, the injured party will bear the risk of
not being able to collect the balance of his damage, i.e., $300,000.
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B. Disadvantages
The main difficulty inherent in the Rule of the Statutory
Maximum is the fact that by its very nature this rule is characterized
by a significant degree of arbitrariness, such that it gives rise to a
concern of setting too high or too low a maximum. As a result of
this concern, a variety of difficulties might arise that will not be
resolved. Thus, in terms of expressive considerations that attribute
importance to the unique status of the regulatory authority as a
defendant, the determination not only that the authority was
negligent but also the extent of the damage that the regulatory
authority was responsible for causing may be important for public
and political criticism of the regulatory authority’s activities (and
consequently for the purposes of drawing conclusions, enacting
regulations and the like). If the Rule of the Statutory Maximum is
set too low, this might prevent this important public and political
criticism of the regulatory authority’s activities.
In terms of effective deterrence, considering the attempt to
direct the behavior of the regulator efficiently, the setting of a
maximum that is too high can be expected to retain the concern
about over-deterrence of the authority. On the other hand, the setting
of a maximum that is too low may create a loss expectancy that is
lower than the damage that the regulatory authority actually caused,
with the likely outcome being inadequate deterrence.
Another disadvantage of the Rule of the Statutory Maximum
is its lack of fairness. Although the Rule of the Statutory Maximum
divides the risk of an inability to collect from the direct tortfeasor
between the regulatory authority and the injured party, its fairness
depends to a large extent on the height of the defined maximum. A
particularly high maximum will benefit the injured party but will be
unfair from the regulatory authority’s perspective. The injured party
will be able to collect compensation from the authority that exceeds
its proportionate share of the compensation, up to the maximum
sum. If indeed a very high maximum is defined, it will increase the
risk of a gap between the regulatory authority’s proportionate share
of the compensation and the maximum sum. Accordingly, it will
increase the risk of not being able to collect from the direct tort-
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feasor, which will be imposed on the regulatory authority’s shoulders. On the other hand, the setting of a maximum that is exceedingly low will benefit the authority but will be unfair from the
injured party’s perspective. The setting of a maximum that is too
low will retain the risk of an inability to collect from the direct
tortfeasor, a risk that will now be imposed on the injured party.
The setting of a statutory maximum that is too low is also
liable to create a lack of fairness in relation to another aspect that
relates to a difference in the volume of damages between the injured
parties inter se. For example the negligent regulation of a polluting
factory, which eventually causes damage to two communities, one
that is adjacent to the factory and another that is some distance
away. The residents of the community adjacent to the factory suffer
severe personal injuries, while the residents of the more distant
community suffer only minor personal injuries. Under the judicial
regime of a statutory maximum, a scenario might occur where the
injured parties who suffered serious injuries will be awarded the
same sum of compensation awarded to the injured parties who suffered only minor injuries52 (assuming that the mild personal injuries
are also equal to or higher than the maximum sum). In close connection to this, while some injured parties will be awarded full compensation for their damages, others will only receive partial compensation, an outcome that contradicts the objective of compensation and
considerations of corrective justice.53
Finally, setting a statutory maximum that is excessively high
can be expected to retain the concern about high administrative costs
of accident, for a variety of reasons including the expected increase
in the number of claims, prolonging of the duration of proceedings
due to the authority’s investment of considerable resources in
defending itself against the claims, the thwarting of efficient settlements and the prolonging of the duration of proceedings due to
recourse claims. In this context, it should be emphasized that the
Rule of the Statutory Maximum does not have the power to prevent
administrative costs derived from recourse claims among tortfea52
53
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sors. In essence, the degree of reduction of these costs depends on
the height of the maximum, so that the higher the maximum, the
greater the risk that supervisory authorities will be adjudged to pay
higher compensation than their share of the damage, and therefore
they will strive to recoup the balance of the compensation that they
incurred from the direct tortfeasors.
C. Statutory Maximum—From Theory to Practice
i. How to Determine the Maximum
An important conclusion to be drawn from the theoretical
analysis in section II(B) (Disadvantages) is that when beginning to
implement the Rule of the Statutory Maximum we must strive to
avoid setting a single uniform sum that will apply to all of the
supervisory authorities in all possible scenarios. As shown, the
danger here lies in its arbitrariness, and in the concern that the maximum set might be too high, or, alternatively, too low. Thus, for
example, that same maximum might be too low in the instance of a
major authority whose pockets are deep and whose activities
generate a particularly high loss expectancy, but it might create a
risk of a substantial economic loss for a small authority with meagre
budgets that usually generates a negligible loss expectancy. Likewise, that same maximum might be too low in relation to damages
caused to many individuals due to the failures of a major regulatory
authority, whose supervisory activities affect many, but disproportionately high in the case of a single individual who was injured due
to the failures of a small regulatory authority, whose activities are
relevant to him alone (or to a miniscule number of individuals).
Considering these matters, the question arises: in what ways can a
customized, dynamic, and varying maximum sum be determined?
Proposed below are two possible methods in response to this
question.
One possible method is to determine the maximum sum as
some function of the number of individuals—the consumers of the
relevant regulatory activity at the time the alleged negligence
occurred. Of course, supervisory failures relating to a popular infant
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food are not similar in magnitude to supervisory failures relating to a
horse farm that operated without a permit. This method for determining the maximum sum gives expression to the fact that the
extent of the damage caused due to the authorities’ supervisory
failures can vary depending upon the number of individuals relying
on the regulatory activity.
It appears that determining the maximum sum in this way
has several advantages: since the number of individuals relying on
the regulatory activity reflects to some extent the extent of the damage expected from this activity, and since the regulatory authority is
aware, or should be aware, of the number of individuals that it is
affecting with its activities, this criterion is consistent with considerations of effective deterrence. Regulatory authorities whose
activities affect a large population will be aware of the fact that they
are exposed to wide-scale liability and, accordingly, will take significant measures of care when performing their regulatory work, and
vice versa. A regulatory authority that is aware of the size of the
population relying on its activities can, in this way, pre-assess the
magnitude of the liability to which it is exposed and plan ahead
accordingly, to decide to not supervise particular bodies at all, to
closely supervise others, etc. From the point of view of potential
injured parties, this method also enables them to pre-assess the
maximum compensation to which they will be entitled in the event
that they incur damage and prepare themselves accordingly.
Notwithstanding its advantages, this method for determining
the maximum is not free of difficulties. For example, while the
number of consumers of the regulatory activity in particular sectors
(such as the car insurance sector), is known at almost any given
moment, in other sectors (such as the retail food sector) it is more
difficult to assess this number. Moreover, the number of individuals
relying on the State’s regulatory activities might fluctuate considerably and not remain constant. These characteristics could create
uncertainty with regard to the volume of the liability to which the
regulatory authority might be exposed in the event of a tort claim,
could thwart the objective of effective deterrence and could lower
the parties’ incentives to settle. Furthermore, we have to acknowledge that the number of consumers of the regulatory activity might
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not reflect the volumes of the damage that might be caused to third
parties as a result of the regulatory authority’s supervisory failures.
These volumes depend not only on the number of injured parties,
but also on the types of damage incurred. In the event that a limited
number of individuals suffer serious personal injuries, the magnitude of the damage is liable to be substantially higher than a maximum that is based solely on the number of individuals relying on the
regulatory activities. The outcome of these circumstances can be
expected to be disproportionate prejudice to the injured parties’ right
to compensation.
A second possible method for formulating the maximum
sum is determining it as some function of the regulatory authority’s
total budgets in the budget year relevant to the alleged negligence.54
This method provides a single stable criterion for assessing the size
of the regulatory authority, which is based on the assumption that
the size of an authority’s budgets also reflects to some extent the
loss expectancy anticipated from its activities. Simply put, the more
that the regulatory activities involve higher risk, the more likely it is
that the regulatory authority will take this risk into account by
demanding higher budgets,55 so there is some correlation between
the volume of the budgets allocated to the authority and the loss
expectancy of its activities. If this is the case, higher budgets, which
will, in turn, lead to the setting of a higher maximum, will usually be
connected to a high loss expectancy—and vice versa. The outcome
can be expected to be effective deterrence.
Furthermore, since there is some connection between the
size of an authority’s budget and the loss expectancy that its regulatory activities generate, this method can be expected to create a
correlation between the height of the maximum and the extent of the
damage that is liable to be caused to third parties—an outcome that
is consistent with considerations of corrective justice and the
objective of compensation.
54

The origin of this proposal is a suggestion to set the maximum sum as a function
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However, notwithstanding the logic in these assumptions, it
appears that a correlation does not necessarily exist between the size
of an authority’s budgets and the loss expectancy that its activities
generate, because the activities of a regulatory authority with meager budgets are also liable to potentially cause extensive damage. In
other words, a maximum set solely according to the size of the
authority’s budgets is liable to not faithfully reflect the high loss
expectancy that the authority’s activities generate, and thus also
might not take into account the substantial damage that the injured
parties actually suffered. Moreover, not only does a correlation not
necessarily exist between a large budget and the extensive damage
that the authority is liable to cause to third parties, sometimes the
opposite is the case, i.e., the authority’s budgets reflect its strength
and its ability to institute measures of care. If this is the case, then
actually it is regulatory authorities with “shallow pockets” that are
prone to generate a higher loss expectancy. The outcome can be
expected to be, therefore, inadequate deterrence and prejudice to
injured parties’ right to fair compensation. Finally, it appears that the
volume of authorities’ budgets is also subject to some fluctuations,
due to either economic prosperity or recession, a government
decision to lower the tax rate or raise it, and so on. If this is the case,
then this criterion is also liable to create uncertainty in relation to the
extent of regulatory authorities’ liability, including the potential for
ineffective deterrence that is inherent in this.
As can be seen, both methods for determining the sum of the
statutory maximum discussed in this section are characterized by
theoretical and practical difficulties. These difficulties led me, in the
final analysis, to reject a statutory maximum in its pure form.
ii. How to Implement the Maximum
Regardless of the method for setting the maximum, the
question still remains: which method should be adopted to implement this maximum?56 The three possible methods include:
(1) applying the maximum to every lawsuit successfully won against
56
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the authority separately; (2) applying the maximum to all lawsuits
successfully won against the authority during a given budget year;
(3) applying the maximum to all lawsuits successfully won against
the authority that derive from the same regulatory failure.
As stated, the first method for implementing the maximum is
to apply the maximum to every lawsuit successfully won against the
authority separately, and its advantage is in instances when a single
regulatory failure produced a single giant lawsuit against the regulatory authority. In these cases, it is enough to apply the maximum to
that lawsuit in order to eliminate those negative outcomes mentioned in the previous sections. On the other hand, this method
might not provide an adequate solution for the aforesaid negative
outcomes in instances where a series of small or medium-sized
lawsuits are filed against the authority by various injured parties,
whether deriving from a single failure or different failures—when
each of them on its own does not exceed the maximum sum but
together exceed it signiﬁcantly. In these instances, although each
lawsuit on its own does not pose a serious threat to the authority, if
they are filed consecutively and before the authority manages to
recover, they will create a real danger, due to all of the concerns that
justify limiting the liability, as discussed and analyzed above.
Moreover, in the absence of a maximum sum of compensation that
the authority is liable to incur in a given budget year, and considering that the number of injured parties and the volume of the
damages are not known, this retains the problem of uncertainty
about the volume of liability to be imposed on the authority, with all
of the negative repercussions that this entails.
A second method for implementing the maximum is to apply
the maximum to all lawsuits successfully won against the authority
in a given budget year. This method provides a solution for the
disadvantages of the first method. Since according to this method
the maximum is applied to all lawsuits received during the budget
year, it could reduce the economic risk to which the regulatory
authority is exposed and the uncertainty as to the volume of its
liability during this period. However, this method is also not free of
disadvantages and difficulties. One way to apply this method is to
award compensation to injured parties up until the maximum
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prescribed by law for that budget year is exhausted. Applying the
method in this way might lead to giving coincidental preference to
injured parties who filed lawsuits separately according to the
chronological order of the judgments being handed down. As a
result, some injured parties will be awarded compensation for all of
their damages, while others will not receive any compensation at all,
which is an outcome that is inconsistent with the objective of
compensation and with principles of fairness, equality and corrective
justice. Also, adopting the filing date of the lawsuit as the record
date so that the maximum will apply to all lawsuits filed during the
budget year will not resolve this difficulty.
Although this rule may motivate plaintiffs to file their lawsuits as soon as possible, it is obvious that not all lawsuits will be
filed by that deadline. Consequently, once again, this creates coincidental preference among injured parties according to the chronological order of the filing of lawsuits. We can try to cope with this
difficulty by collecting and postponing all execution proceedings
until the end of the budget year, when the inclusive sum of the
lawsuits accepted against the regulatory authority becomes evident,
but it appears that this also poses some difficulty, since it would
require postponing the carrying out of judgments and thus delay the
payment of compensation to injured parties. Furthermore, in the
absence of a decision about how to divide the maximum compensation among the various injured parties, and due to the fact that the
lawsuits are likely to derive from different failures, disputes among
injured parties can be expected to arise with regard to the mode of
distribution of the maximum sum. The resolution of these disputes
will apparently require another round of litigations, with the increase
in the administrative costs of accident that this entails.
Moreover, according to the second method, the application
of the statutory maximum is subject to manipulation by any of the
parties, to the extent that they can influence the date of issue of the
judgment. The authority, on its part, will strive to concentrate as
many judgments as possible in a single budget year so that the
inclusive sum that it will incur in a given year will exceed the
maximum sum. On the other hand, injured parties will strive to
spread out the judgments over several years so that the inclusive
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sum that the authority will incur in a given year will not exceed the
maximum sum. Furthermore, according to this method, the application of the maximum is liable to be influenced by incidental reasons
relating to the judge’s docket, such as an unusually heavy workload,
i.e., reasons that have nothing to do with considerations that justify
limiting the regulatory authority’s liability.
The third method for applying the maximum focuses on all
lawsuits successfully won against the authority deriving from the
same regulatory failure. This method has an advantage over the first
method in instances when a single failure prompts a large number of
lawsuits and when each of them on its own does not exceed the
maximum sum but together, they do exceed it. In these instances,
the maximum will apply to all lawsuits deriving from that same act
or omission, thereby mitigating the economic risk facing the regulatory authority and reducing the uncertainty as to the volume of its
liability, with all of the advantages that this entails. On the other
hand, in instances where different failures prompted different lawsuits, then this method has disadvantages compared to the first
method, and it does not remove the economic risk facing the
authority or create the necessary certainty as to the expected volume
of liability.
Furthermore, it appears that this method has disadvantages
compared to the second method. If this method is applied so that the
court will award compensation to plaintiffs who filed separate
lawsuits in respect of the same regulatory failure until the maximum
prescribed by law is exhausted, then this will create coincidental
preference to injured parties depending upon the date the judgment
was issued.57 Applying the maximum in a concentrated manner to
all lawsuits filed in respect of the same failure will force the court to
wait until the statute of limitations prescribed by law has passed
(i.e., until the deadline for filing lawsuits in respect of the same
cause) in order to distribute the compensation among the injured
parties. The outcome will be a significant delay in paying compensation to the injured parties.
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See id. at 434.

38

BUFFALO ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL

[VOL. 27

Considering the three methods discussed in this section,
there are jurists who believe that the optimal method for applying
the maximum is the third method, coupled with devising a
mechanism for consolidating all lawsuits originating from the same
act or omission in a single proceeding, so that a single judgment will
be handed down with regard to the mode of distribution of the
maximum sum of the compensation among all of the injured
parties.58 This method will enable the application of the maximum
one time for the same regulatory failure, regardless of the number of
lawsuits accepted against the regulatory authority due to that same
failure, whatever it may be. This method will mitigate to some
extent the economic risk that the regulatory authority faces and raise
the level of certainty regarding the volume of its liability. At the
same time, this method will eliminate the disadvantages of the other
methods, such as preferential treatment of injured parties and
manipulations of judgment issue dates.
Furthermore, a method that combines a single judicial decision with the application of the maximum on all lawsuits deriving
from the same regulatory failure will enable the court to distribute
the sum of the maximum compensation among the injured parties at
the time of the judgment, proportionately to the sums of compensation awarded to them. This will minimize disputes between the
parties as to the mode of distribution of the maximum sum and will
avoid another round of litigations over the mode of distribution of
this sum. Furthermore, we can expect a consolidation of the hearing
of actions that raise similar judicial and factual questions in order to
streamline and shorten the proceedings, which will also avoid
instances of contradictory judgments. This should produce savings
in administrative costs. Coupled with these advantages, this method
requires the creation of a procedural mechanism as stated, with all of
the costs that this entails. Moreover, according to this method, in
instances where a number of claims deriving from different failures
are filed against the authority, the economic risk that the authority
faces will remain, along with the uncertainty regarding the total size
of compensation.
58
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IV. HYBRID RULES
In sections B, Rule of Proportional Liability, and C, The
Rule of the Statutory Maximum, we discussed pure rules for
limiting the liabilities of supervisory authorities. The first rule was
based on the concept of proportional liability alone, while the
second rule was based on the concept of the statutory maximum.
The law in practice is also often based on a key central concept,
which is joint and several liability. Nonetheless, this does not mean
that it is not possible to combine these three concepts and to forge
mixed rules for the purpose of limiting the liability. Here the discussion will focus on three possible rules for limiting the liability,
which integrate the aforesaid concepts: the first rule will be a
“hybrid” between the concept of the statutory maximum and the
concept of proportional liability; the second rule will integrate joint
and several liability with proportional liability; and the third rule
will integrate to some extent all three concepts of joint and several
liability, proportional liability and a statutory maximum.59
A. Between a Statutory Maximum and Proportional Liability
According to this rule, the liability of public supervisory
authorities will be limited through a combination of a statutory
maximum and proportional liability. Therefore, if the statutory
maximum will be higher than the regulatory authority’s proportionate share of the compensation, injured parties will be able to receive
compensation from it up to its proportionate share of the compensation, and it will not be possible to collect the balance of the compensation from it up to the maximum sum. On the other hand, if the
statutory maximum will be lower than the regulatory authority’s
proportionate share of the compensation, it will be possible to
adjudge the payment of compensation solely up to the statutory
maximum, even if its share of the compensation is higher.
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In order to illustrate this rule, return to the analogy of the
polluting factory, in which the injured party’s damages totaled
$500,000. Now assume that the sum of the statutory maximum is
$150,000. If the court rules that the regulatory authority’s proportionate share of the damage is $100,000, then it will not be possible
to collect from the latter the balance of the compensation up to the
height of the maximum, but only its proportionate share ($100,000).
On the other hand, if the court rules that the regulatory authority’s
proportionate share of the damage is $200,000, then it will be
possible to adjudge the payment of compensation solely up to the
maximum sum ($150,000), even though its share of the compensation is higher than this sum.
The advantage of this rule is that it provides a solution for
the key difficulties inherent in the Rule of Proportional Liability.
This rule enhances the certainty as to the maximum sums of compensation that the regulatory authority is liable to incur, with all of
the positive implications that this entails. Coupled with this advantage, this rule retains the other advantages of the Rule of Proportional Liability. Thus, for example, this rule enables the reflection of
the regulatory authority’s relative fault (when its share of the
damage is smaller than or equal to the maximum sum). Thus, this
rule is consistent with considerations of fairness and deterrence (as
long as the maximum sum is not less than the regulatory authority’s
proportionate share of the damage).
However, the weakness of this rule is quite obvious. From
the perspective of injured parties, this alternative is the most
disadvantageous of all of the alternatives discussed up to this point,
since the regulatory authority’s liability is now limited by two
thresholds. Now the injured party will be awarded low compensation, both in instances when the regulatory authority’s proportionate
share of the compensation is lower than the maximum sum (since in
that case, the injured parties will receive low compensation
according to the regulatory authority’s proportionate share and not
according to the maximum sum), and in instances when the
regulatory authority’s proportionate share of the compensation is
higher than the maximum sum (since in that case, the injured parties
will receive low compensation according to the maximum sum, and
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not the regulatory authority’s full proportionate share of the
damage). Consequently, this alternative can be expected to produce
outcomes that are not optimal in terms of considerations of fairness,
corrective justice and the objective of compensation.
B. Between Proportional Liability and Joint and Several
Liability
According to this hybrid rule, each of the tortfeasors will be
adjudged to pay a share of the damage according to their relative
culpability for causing the damage. Furthermore, in instances when
it becomes evident that a portion of the compensation is not
collectible from any of the tortfeasors, the injured party will be
awarded compensation because the solvent tortfeasors will bear
relative liability for this portion of the compensation according to
the rate of their relative fault.60 It is possible to characterize two
methods for implementing this rule. According to one method, the
Rule of Proportional Liability will be applied initially so that the
injured party can collect the various tortfeasors’ proportionate shares
of the compensation and no more than that. During the second stage,
after it becomes evident that the injured party cannot collect compensation from any of the tortfeasors according to its share, the
injured party will be able to apply to the court to re-allocate this
portion of the compensation. According to the second method, the
Rule of Joint and Several Liability will be applied initially, and the
injured party will be able to collect all of the compensation from
each of the tortfeasors. During the second stage, and only after it
becomes evident that the tortfeasor that bore the entire compensation
cannot recoup from any of the tortfeasors its portion of the compensation, will that tortfeasor be able to apply to the court to re-allocate
this portion of the compensation.
Return to the analogy of the polluting factory, but this time
in order to illustrate how this rule is implemented. The facts of the
60
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case will be slightly changed by adding another polluting factory.
Now, an inn and two polluting factories are located in close
proximity to one another, and the two factories are consciously
raising the level of the pollution they are causing above the level
permitted by the regulatory authority. The authority, notwithstanding periodic tests that it conducts, does not detect the violations of
the two factories. The injured party’s inclusive damage in the
analogy remains at $500,000. Assume that during the hearing, the
court decides that Factory A’s proportionate share of the damage is
$200,000 and Factory B’s proportionate share of the damage is also
$200,000, while the regulatory authority’s proportionate share is
only $100,000. It further becomes evident that Factory A’s share is
uncollectible. According to this rule, the court will be able to reallocate the uncollectible share among the rest of the tortfeasors
according to their relative culpability.
One method for calculating the compensation is by relying
on the fact that Factory B and the regulatory authority will jointly
pay a total of $300,000 to the injured party, whereas Factory B paid
2/3 of this sum and the regulatory authority paid 1/3 of the sum.
According to this method, the uncollectible share of Factory A
should also be divided, so that Factory B will pay $133,333 of the
uncollectible $200,000, while the regulatory authority will pay
$66,000 of that sum. According to this method, Factory B will pay a
total of $333,333, while the regulatory authority will pay a total of
$166,000. This distribution demonstrates that the regulatory
authority is an indirect and secondary tortfeasor, and also awards
full compensation to the injured party.
A second method relies on Factory’s B’s share of the
inclusive damage is 2/5, while the regulatory authority’s share is
1/5. That being the case, according to this method, Factory A’s
uncollectible share will also be divided between the two, so that
Factory B will pay $80,000 of those uncollectible $200,000, while
the regulatory authority will pay a total of $40,000 of that sum. It is
important to note that according to this method, the solvent tortfeasors are paying only 3/5 of the insolvent tortfeasor’s share. This
method also shows that the regulatory authority’s contribution to the
damage in these cases is indirect and secondary. Furthermore, unlike
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the first method, this method divides the risk that any of the
tortfeasors’ shares will not be collectible between the injured party
and the rest of the tortfeasors, since the rest of the tortfeasors will
not bear the remaining 2/5 of factory A’s share, and the injured party
will not be awarded compensation for this share. In this way, all of
the “players” involved in the array of torts are taking part. The
injured party is not awarded compensation for all of his damage,
while the solvent tortfeasors are paying him more than their share.
On the other hand, this method does not fulfill the objective of
compensation as well as the first method does.
There are many advantages to this rule. Unlike the alternative of applying the pure form of the Rule of Joint and Several
Liability (where all of the risk of an uncollectible share of compensation falls on the shoulders of the more accessible and solvent tortfeasor), and unlike applying the pure form of the Rule of Proportional Liability (when all of the risk of an uncollectible share of
compensation falls on the shoulders of the injured party), this hybrid
rule enables dividing the risk of an uncollectible share of compensation among the various tortfeasors and also between the injured
party and the tortfeasors. This rule is not plagued by the lack of
fairness that exists in the pure alternatives, which require choosing
between achieving fairness from the injured party’s perspective and
achieving fairness from the tortfeasor’s perspective.61 The advantage
of this method compared to the Rule of the Statutory Maximum is
that according to the latter, the division of the risk of an uncollectible share of compensation between the tortfeasor and the injured
party is often arbitrary. Furthermore, this alternative achieves better
outcomes in terms of the objective of compensation by allowing the
injured party to be compensated by the tortfeasor at a ratio larger
than its proportionate share of compensation.62 Finally, preserving a
principle of relative fault also in relation to the division of the risk of
an uncollectible share of compensation is consistent with the
considerations of effective deterrence, since now the tortfeasor’s

61
62

See McBride, supra note 18, at 189.
See Lindsey, supra note 10, at 976–77.

44

BUFFALO ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL

[VOL. 27

incentives will also be motivated by an attempt to influence its
relative share of the risk of an uncollectible share of compensation.
Despite the advantages of this alternative, its disadvantages
are also quite obvious. First, this alternative’s advantages are
primarily relevant in situations involving three or more tortfeasors,
and when the share of one tortfeasor is uncollectible. Obviously, in
instances when only two parties caused damage (a direct tortfeasor
and a supervisory authority) and the direct tortfeasor’s share is
uncollectible, it would be pointless for the regulatory authority to
apply to the court to re-allocate the direct tortfeasor’s share of the
compensation among the rest of the tortfeasors, because apart from
the regulatory authority itself there are no additional tortfeasors
(although the adoption of the second mode of implementation
discussed above will lead to a situation where, also in scenarios such
as these, the regulatory authority will not bear the direct tortfeasor’s
entire share). Furthermore, since this alternative is based on the
principle of proportional liability, it has all of the disadvantages of
the Rule of Proportional Liability discussed above, i.e., it retains the
risk of an extensive volume of liability, as well as the uncertainty
regarding the sums of compensation, with all of the negative
repercussions this entails. Moreover, unlike the method of the pure
form of proportional liability, this alternative entails higher administrative costs, due to the need to apply for a re-allocation of the
uncollectible sum, similarly to the mechanism of contribution
claims.
C. Between Joint and Several Liability and Proportional
Liability—Through a Statutory Maximum
This rule reflects some representation of the three concepts
vying for precedence: joint and several liability, proportional
liability and a statutory maximum. It preserves the concept of joint
and several liability in particular scenarios and adopts the concept of
proportional liability in other scenarios, while decision making on
the question of which concept applies under the circumstances of the
case is guided by a statutory maximum. These matters require an
explanation.
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According to the proposed rule, the joint-and-several liability regime should be retained so long as the plaintiff’s total damages
do not exceed a particular sum. On the other hand, in instances when
the injured party’s damage is higher than the maximum sum, the
liability for his damages will be according to the proportional liability regime.63 In this way, when the inclusive sum of the plaintiff’s
damages does not exceed the maximum sum, the accessible and
solvent regulatory authority bears the risk that the direct tortfeasor’s
share will be uncollectible, and the plaintiff is assured that he will
receive compensation for all of his damage. This is based on the idea
that up to a particular sum defined as a maximum, the regulatory
authority is not exposed to any significant economic risk.
Although this rule attempts to take the middle road, it presents material difficulties. First, it retains the problem of the maximum sum being arbitrary, as discussed above. Furthermore, the
objective of compensation is adversely affected under this rule
precisely when the plaintiff’s damages are severe and substantial,
i.e., in situations when one can assume that the injured party is in
dire need of compensation, he is made to bear the risk that the direct
tortfeasor might be insolvent. Finally, this rule is liable to encourage
the filing of futile lawsuits that do not exceed the maximum sum,
with all of the administrative costs of accident that this entails.
Therefore, it appears that this rule is not optimal.
V. CONCLUSION
As the Rule of Joint and Several Liability gives rise to
numerous disputes, this article analyzed several alternatives to the
rule, with the key question being: which rule optimally divides—
between the plaintiff and the indirect tortfeasor—the risk that the
direct tortfeasor’s share of the compensation is uncollectible? Three
possible alternatives for limiting the liability of regulatory authori63

Kraft uses the state of Florida as an example where the Rule of Joint and Several
Liability was applied in cases in which the total damage did not exceed $25,000,
while in cases where the sum is higher than that, the liability for the injured party’s
damages was based on the relative fault of each of the parties. See Kraft, supra
note 16, at 196–98.
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ties were scrutinized and analyzed: (1) switching to the Rule of
Proportional Liability; (2) adopting the Rule of a Statutory Maximum; and (3) the use of hybrid rules. This article discussed the
various advantages and disadvantages of each of the alternatives, the
choice between them depending to a large extent on the objective
facing the legislature. The decision about which of the paths analyzed in this article should be taken is a normative question, which
depends on the outcomes that each path produces and upon a
normative assessment of these outcomes compared to their
alternatives.
In light of the aforesaid, the position of this article is that as a
principled decision, it is warranted to examine the possibility of
adopting a flexible rule that will be customized according to the circumstances of the case. As presented in this article, there are contexts in which it would be preferable to consider the Rule of Joint
and Several Liability, while in others the Rule of Proportional
Liability would be preferable, and in others the Rule of a Statutory
Maximum. When deciding which path to take, the court can take
into account numerous considerations including the gravity of the
alleged negligence, its duration, the type and extent of the damage
caused, the degree of risk to the cause of the damage to which the
regulatory authority exposed the injured party, the intensity of the
connection between the regulatory failure and the damage suffered
by the injured party, the question of whether the authority’s failure
constitutes a major and key link in the cause of the damage or
whether it is minor and secondary, the injured party’s access to
insurance, considerations of fairness and justice, and additional
considerations. This flexible rule may better fulfill the objectives of
tort law than the current situation. In the final analysis, the preferable alternative in our view is, therefore, a determination that the
choice of the proper rule should be based on these considerations,
and the contents of these considerations should be decided on the
basis of the factual data in each case.
Insofar as the court will choose the Rule of Proportional
Liability, and as evident from the discussion in section II(C) (Proportional Liability—from Theory to Practice), it is not recommended to apply the pure form of proportional liability, but rather
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taking a middle road that advocates openness on one hand and
prudence on the other, through six alternatives for the application of
the Rule of Proportional Liability solely under particular circumstances. Among the six alternatives proposed, special attention may
be given to the fourth alternative, which divides the risk between the
indirect tortfeasor and the plaintiff. Although this alternative is not
free of difficulties, it gives fair expression to the main justifications
for limiting the liability of regulatory authorities, without abandoning the objective of compensating the injured party. It creates a
delicate balance between these competing objectives in that it
divides the risk that the direct tortfeasor’s share of the compensation
might not be collectible among the remaining parties in the case, i.e.,
between the regulatory authority and the plaintiff.
In summary, the proposed judicial rule represents a good
compromise between two extreme positions: retaining the Rule of
Joint and Several Liability absolutely (which imposes an excessive
burden on the regulatory authority) and abrogating the rule altogether (which is liable to be unfair towards plaintiffs). This rule
attempts to award fair and suitable compensation to plaintiffs while
taking a wider view of the concept of “fairness,” a view that also
takes into account the division of the liability among defendants that
may not be comprised of a single unit. Therefore, this alternative
approximates the provision of a solution to both groups for important (yet sometimes contradictory) objectives of tort law, namely
compensation and distributive justice, compared to fairness, corrective justice and effective deterrence.

